Uma análise griceana das estratégias discursivas em ciência orientada para tomar decisões: bullshit, incerteza e significado by Bengoetxea, Juan Bautista
This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC 
BY 4.0), which permits reproduction, adaptation, and distribution provided the original author and source are credited.
Filosofia Unisinos 
Unisinos Journal of Philosophy
18(1):24-35, jan/apr 2017
Unisinos – doi: 10.4013/fsu.2017.181.04
ABSTRACT
The popular notion of bullshit and the term that expresses it has received little philosophical 
attention despite the fact that it pervades much of human discourse. Frankfurt recovered 
bullshit analysis in the eighties and opened the way to studies on its nature and function. 
Our interest in bullshit is philosophically analytical, but also practical, as bullshit particularly 
affects the field of science policy. In order to understand that double character, we first pres-
ent Grice’s model of meaning of expressions and then summarize the controversy between 
the tobacco industry and the US Administration, which allows us to state our basic hypoth-
esis: tobacco companies have developed and implemented a discursive tactic of bullshit in 
order to delay or avoid governmental regulations and decisions. Before eventually applying 
the Gricean model to various cases of bullshit, we locate our approach against the back-
ground of the comparison between sound and junk science.
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RESUMO
A noção popular de bullshit eo termo que expressa não receberam atenção filosófica ex-
cessiva, apesar de que se estende por grande parte do discurso falado e escrito. Frankfurt 
recupera a análise do bullshit na década de 1980 e, assim, abriu o caminho para estudos 
sobre sua natureza e função. Nosso interesse na bullshit é especificamente analítico, mas 
também pragmática na medida em que afeta o domínio da política da ciência. Para en-
tender esse caráter duplo, primeiro apresentamos o modelo de Grice do significado de 
expressões de linguagem e, em seguida, depois de sintetizar as principais disputas entre a 
indústria de tabaco e a administração dos EUA, estabelecemos a nossa hipótese de base: as 
empresas de tabaco têm desenvolvido e implementado uma técnica discursiva do bullshit 
a fim de retardar ou prevenir muitos regulamentos e decisões do governo. Antes de final-
mente aplicar o modelo griceana a vários casos de bullshit, colocamos nosso foco contra 
um fundo no qual a discernir a ‘boa ciência’ da ‘má ciência’.
Palavras-chave: Grice, intenção, significado, indústria de tabaco, bullshit, má ciência, incerteza.1 University of the Balearic Islands. 
Ctra. Valldemossa, Km 7.5, 07122, 
Palma, Balearic Islands, Spain. 
E-mail: juanbautista.bengoechea@uib.cat
A Gricean analysis of discursive 
strategies in decision-oriented 
science: Bullshit, uncertainty, 
and meaning
Uma análise griceana das estratégias discursivas 
em ciência orientada para tomar decisões: bullshit, 
incerteza e significado
Juan Bautista Bengoetxea1
A Gricean analysis of discursive strategies in decision-oriented science: Bullshit, uncertainty, and meaning
Filosofi a Unisinos – Unisinos Journal of Philosophy – 18(1): 24-35, jan/apr 2017 25
Introduction
For the second half of the twentieth century, the tobac-
co industry has opposed governmental regulation on the sale 
and consumption of cigarettes. The discussion between both 
sides has taken place in several arenas, primarily the courts, 
the public media and the academic-scientific community.2 
One of our aims here is to study the strategy used by the to-
bacco industry from a double philosophical perspective: firstly, 
we shall establish a frame for understanding this strategy in 
terms of Paul Grice’s (1989b [1969]) model for analyzing the 
concept of meaning by means of intentions. Secondly, we shall 
conceptualize the form that this strategy takes in order to gen-
erate uncertainty – making this an example of the production 
of bullshit.3 Of course, we recognize that there are different 
cases – asbestos, chemical industry – where controversies have 
emerged between the scientific community and corporations. 
However, the “tobacco wars” are unique on account of two fea-
tures: their more direct repercussions on the general public, 
and the duration of the dispute. It cannot be forgotten that 
during the second half of the twentieth century, the tobacco 
industry took great care and attention to detail in trying to ac-
tivate an “anti-causalist” strategy that could detach itself from 
cancer and other smoking-related diseases. Evidence of this is 
provided by Michaels and Monforton who point to several 
clear preferences of the tobacco industry, which make plain 
its intention to activate such an “anti-causalist” strategy.4 It is 
these kinds of statements to which we will apply Grice’s model 
in order to both understand the meaning of those words and 
detect the obstacles confronting this attempt at comprehen-
sion. The production of bullshit meets our goal.
Bullshit
In a nutshell, bullshit is a kind of discourse that aims at 
generating confusion and inscrutability for an audicence re-
ceiving a message. Although neither elegant nor accurate, the 
word “bullshit” connotes something that all of us can under-
stand in everyday speech practice. It is claimed that bullshit 
is effective above all when the audience is drawn into a state 
of confusion because the bullshitter lacks any concern for the 
truth (Frankfurt, 2005 [1986], p. 30; Belfiore, 2009, p. 343). 
This may be correct, but it is not a complete diagnosis.
The bullshit notion serves as a starting point for a con-
ceptual analysis of several discourses that appear in scientific 
policies with an intentional quality in their communicative 
acts (see Plunze, 2010, p. 235), since it always points to some-
thing and tries to obtain something. Bullshit usually appears 
in allegedly communicative acts – advertising, political, eco-
nomical – and has become more and more sophisticated as a 
technique. The two best studies on bullshit to date are Harry 
Frankfurt’s (1986) and Gerald Cohen’s (2006) articles. We 
shall call them, respectively, the agency analysis and the content 
analysis. We start with them.
Agency analysis: Beyond the truth-value
Frankfurt studies the agent that commits bullshit. He 
poses the crucial question in the following way: “when do 
we know that somebody is committing bullshit?” According 
to him (Frankfurt, 2005 [1986], p. 33), whenever someone 
who generates and displays a message does not care about 
the truth-value of it, but attempts to hide her lack of interest, 
then she is committing bullshit. As Penny (2005, p. 12) sum-
marizes it, “the liar still cares about the truth. The bullshitter 
is unburdened by such concerns”. Frankfurt prefers to focus 
on the agent’s identity, not on the product of her bullshitting.
Frankfurt starts from two considerations about the bull-
shit phenomenon: first, he claims that the use of the word 
“bullshit” is very wide and varied; and second, he recognizes 
that the phenomenon of bullshit is also too wide and amor-
phous. From this he proceeds to refine the definition that 
Black proposed of the word “humbug”5 (Black, 1983, p. 141) 
and concludes that one of the most relevant characteristics of 
the bullshitter is that “the truth-values of his statements are of 
no central interest to him; what we are not to understand is 
that his intention is neither to report the truth nor to conceal 
it” (Frankfurt, 2005 [1986], p. 55). The bullshitter – the agent 
– then hides the fact that she actually does not care about the 
truth-value of her statements. That is why her intention is 
not to tell the truth, but rather to conceal it. Her reasons for 
discussing and writing about certain things bear no relation 
to any interest in discovering how those things actually are. It 
is clear that Frankfurt refers to the agent and not directly to 
the bullshit concept. It is the agent that he cares about, and in 
some ways he presupposes that it is actually the most import-
ant thing about bullshit.
Bullshit, lies, and fakery
Bullshit status is polyedrical, which renders Frankfurt’s 
characterization unsatisfactory, at least if we wish to under-
2 The analyses requested by the tobacco industry were performed by academically recognized scientists and published in Tobacco and 
Health Research, a journal managed by scientists (Michaels and Monforton, 2005, p. 40).
3 From another perspective, Austin first and then Searle proposed several discursive analyses based upon the notion of speech act.
4 We use ‘utter’ and ‘utterer’ in Grice’s artificial sense, namely “to cover any case of doing x or producing x by the performance of which 
U (utterer) meant that so-and-so” (Grice, 1989a [1968], p. 118).
5 Black admits that the best he can supply is an approximation of the definition of “humbug” in the following terms: “deceptive misrep-
resentation, short of lying, especially by pretentious word or deed, of somebody’s own thoughts, feelings, or attitudes” (Black, 1983, 
p. 144).
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stand the notion as generally valid. Cohen claims that the 
alleged essential element of bullshit is not necessesarily “in-
difference-to-truth” (Cohen, 2006, p. 124). For instance, the 
semantic variant of “bullshit” in fields such as propaganda, ad-
vertising, politics and ideology hardly could be lined up with 
Frankfurt’s agent-essentialism. Advertisers and politicians 
often try to direct us away from the right apprehension of 
reality and to design what Cohen does call “bullshit”, but ac-
cording to Frankfurt, this would amount to lying, not bullshit.
In this way, then, Frankfurt would claim that advertis-
ers and politicians do not typically commit bullshit, at least 
in his sense, but rather some kind of act of lying. However, 
Cohen emphasizes that lying is not independent of bullshit, 
but rather a feature of it. He thinks that a part of the action of 
lying – not all – is bullshitting, and that is why he claims that 
Frankfurt’s analysis is too limited (Cohen, 2006, p. 125) and 
that the confrontation the latter establishes between lying 
and bullshitting is wrongly posed. In order to improve upon 
it, Cohen proposes to distinguish between tactic and goal. 
Usually, the liar says something she believes to be false: that 
is her tactic. But she also seeks to deceive her audience about 
some fact: that is her goal. Eventually, she achieves her goal by 
performing the tactic: she says something that she thinks is 
false with the aim of inducing her audience into believe some-
thing false.6 Few liars, if any, bother themselves to induce false 
beliefs in others.
Cohen’s distinction between tactic and goal sheds new 
light on and enhances Frankfurt’s difficulty in distinguishing 
between lies and bullshit. Whereas identifying a lie by its goal 
– to misdirect someone in relation to reality – Cohen iden-
tifies the bullshitter’s activity in terms of what corresponds 
to the bullshitter’s tactic (Cohen, 2006, p. 127). It seems that 
Frankfurt cannot distinguish between the level of the tactic 
and that of the goal. He says that bullshitting involves a kind 
of bluffing, and that lying and bluffing are both modes of mis-
representation or deception (Frankfurt, 2005 [1986], p. 46). 
The closer concept to a lie is falsity, since the liar is someone 
who promulgates a falsehood; bluffing is similar, but more 
specifically it is a matter not of falsity but of fakery. And, as 
Frankfurt recognizes, this is what accounts for its proximity 
to bullshit, given that the essence of bullshit is not that it is 
false but that it is phony (Frankfurt, 2005 [1986], p. 47).
According to Cohen, Frankfurt’s problem is that he 
locates falsity at the tactical level, whereas fakery relates to 
goals. If a bluff is similar to bullshit, it is just because bullshit-
ting often involves falsity, although the bullshitter usually does 
not utter the falsity as such. Cohen criticizes Frankfurt’s claim 
that the bullshitter may not be interested in the truth-value 
of what she utters (Frankfurt, 2005 [1986], p. 39) because, 
according to the former, the latter mistakes it for a lack of in-
terest in whether it causes the audience to believe that some-
thing is true or false. We should accept that advertisers may 
not be interested in whether or not what they say is true, but 
they are concerned about their credibility. Advertisers want 
the public to believe them. In other words, they focus on the 
thought processes that they want to provoke in consumers, in 
spite of the fact that they eventually want to sell something.
Content analysis: The nonsense
Bullshit is inherently associated with unclarity and non-
sense, according to Cohen (2006, p. 129). Unlike bullshit, 
the lie is identified in terms of falsity together with other 
features attributed to this, say, intention. The concept of a 
liar is elucidated in terms of falsity, not vice versa. Equally, 
the elucidation of the nature of a bullshitter (an agent) can be 
obtained in terms of the thing to which it points: the bullshit 
itself. In order to clarify the notion of bullshit, Cohen appeals 
to the Oxford English Dictionary, which defines it (first entry) 
as “nonsense”. This definition places the bullshit, as an entity, 
into a textual category. It refers not to an activity, but basically 
to the linguistic outcome of an activity.
The liar might tell the truth without any intention of 
doing so, and a non-liar might tell something false by acci-
dent. Any agent who attempts to bullshit could fail and a 
truth lover could accidentally bullshit. Well then, anyone 
who speaks with indifference in the face of truth, in Frank-
furt’s sense, could say something true regardless. However, in 
the sense that is interesting for Cohen, what she says would 
not be bullshit. In addition, an honest person could read 
something that is bullshit – written by a Frankfurtian agent 
– take that article for granted, and then reproduce it. When-
ever that person unconsciously expresses bullshit, she will not 
be disrespecting the truth-value, and that is why it is neither 
necessary nor sufficient for all kinds of bullshit that it is en-
acted by someone who is indifferent to truth or to any other 
distinctive intentional condition. And there exists bullshit 
characteristic of linguistic utterances that would not be bull-
shit according to the intentional condition of the generator of 
such an utterance.
Now, this feature of the utterances is a variety of non-
sense peculiar to the discourse that cannot be elucidated as 
such. It is not just a dark discourse; it is also one that cannot 
be clarified; it is non-elucidable and involves two aspects in-
herent to it: first, it is rubbish, since it is a logically faulty argu-
mentation with regard to evidence; and second, it is a hope-
lessly speculative remark that is neither obtuse nor logical.
Cohen does not define “clarity”, although he does pro-
vide a sufficient condition for its lack: somebody lacks clar-
ity if when a negation sign is added to or substracted from a 
text, its degree of plausibility does not change (Cohen, 2006, 
p. 131). Our reading stems from this is double moment: (i) 
the bullshitter is willing to bullshit, that is, to yield a lot of 
obtuse statements that cannot be elucidated – rubbish or 
6 This is not the last goal of a liar, of course, since usually lying has a subsequent goal, say, to protect one’s reputation, to secure some 
benefit, or to take advantage of somebody, and so on.
A Gricean analysis of discursive strategies in decision-oriented science: Bullshit, uncertainty, and meaning
Filosofi a Unisinos – Unisinos Journal of Philosophy – 18(1): 24-35, jan/apr 2017 27
gratuitous remarks; (ii) the bullshitter points to the bullshit. 
That is, unlike the naïve speaker who “bullshits” – that is, is a 
victim of it – the bullshitter wants the bullshit to be impossi-
ble to clarify or trust. The bullshitter resorts to bullshit when 
she has reasons for intending that what she says is purposely 
unintelligible and in order to impress others or to give false 
support to some claim or another.
Bringing bullshit into Grice’s model
We find two key notions in Grice’s model that can 
serve to collect and improve the treatment that Frankfurt 
and Cohen respectively make of the notion of bullshit: the 
intention of the speaker and the recognition of the intention 
of the speaker on the part of the audience. As we will see later, 
according to Grice’s model, whenever a speaker utters some-
thing, she does it with the double intention of communicating 
something and of being recognized by the audience (Grice, 
1989b [1969], p. 88). Intention is crucial for shaping an utter-
ance and for the recognition of this fact by the audience. So if 
we consider Grice’s model, we can see that there are three ba-
sic elements: (i) an utterer that has an intention; (ii) an utter-
ance (or uttered message) with a meaning shaped by both the 
utterer’s intention and the recognition of that very intention 
by the audience; and (iii) the audience’s reaction with regard 
to the recognition of some intention.
As we have said previously, Cohen proposes to distin-
guish between tactic and goal. The liar’s tactic consists of say-
ing what she believes that is false, and her goal is to deceive 
her audience about some particular fact. That is why she aims 
at her goal by way of performing the tactic; that is, she says 
something that she thinks is false with the intention of induc-
ing her audience to believe something false.
If we want to fit Cohen’s approach, which in turn criti-
cizes that of Frankfurt, into our Gricean model, we can resort 
to a search for the sufficient conditions for the truth of the 
statements, or discourse, that we would wish to analyze. Con-
sider the following statement:
[S1] Michael means that Jean is a great ath-
lete by the utterance of the statement ‘Jean 
is a great athlete’.7
Let us figure out that the utterance of S1 is addressed to 
a third person, so that this acts as an audience. In this case, a 
first attempt for a sufficient condition for S1 could be this:
[SC-1] Michael intends that his utterance of 
the statement expressed induces in the lis-
tener the belief that Jean is a great athlete.
But Grice does not settle for SC-1, since the intention to 
induce a belief in the audience is not something sufficient by 
itself for it to mean something fixed (a meaning). The SC-1 
condition seems to require something else, which in a Gri-
cean model would take this form:
[SC-2] Michael also intends that the listener 
recognize the intention lying behind his ut-
terance of the statement.
However, in Gricean terms, CS-2 also does not provide 
the sufficient condition for the truth of S1, which in Grice’s 
model requires another condition:
[SC-3] Michael must also have the intention 
that the listener’s recognition of his inten-
tion plays a role in explaining why the listen-
er forms his belief (namely, that S1 is true).
Since bullshit has to do with the lack of clarity and non-
sense, according to Cohen (2006, p. 129), and since a lie is 
identified in terms of falsity together with other features 
attributed to this, basically an intention, Grice’s three con-
ditions pick up both notions of bullshit, i.e., both Frankfurt’s 
and Cohen’s. In Frankfurt’s sense, bullshit is far removed from 
truth-value, which in the Gricean model requires at least 
three steps; that is, there is no direct semantic relationship 
according to which we can identify the truth-value of the 
statement. And in Cohen’s sense, the truth-value is embodied 
in the speaker’s tactic (in this case she would be a mere liar) 
and the commission of what is properly bullshit is depend-
ent on its goal, in which the intention (to deceive) is crucial. 
Here Grice’s model allows us to expose in more detail the 
complexity of this intentional process by incorporating both 
the speaker’s “intention of recognition” and her “intention of 
recognition of intentions”. Let us see how this apparently odd 
analysis can be extended to cases of a real discourse of the 
scientific practice and of scientific policy.
A Gricean frame for bullshit
Grice (1989b [1969]) proposes the concept of utterer’s 
meaning for two reasons: on the one hand, it may serve as the 
ground for a general concept of meaning and, on the other, it 
may be what makes the difference with regard to the concept 
of meaning of an utterance. The underlying idea is that we have 
to analyze the meaning of the utterer if we want to understand 
the meaning of any utterance. The distinction between both 
kinds of meaning is not trivial then. Its relevance rests on the 
fact that the utterer’s meaning allows for the introduction of a 
key element into the study of conventional meaning, namely 
the intention. It is necessary to take this notion into account in 
order to implement Grice’s conversational maxims (Grice, 1989c 
[1975], p. 26-27) and to assess whether or not – in the case of 
a discursive controversy such as “tobacco wars” – they are met.
7 We will always refer to the case of unnatural meaning (see Grice, 1957, p. 378f).
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Intentions and utterer’s meaning
According to Grice’s model, whenever a speaker utters 
something, she does it with the double intention of commu-
nicating something and of being recognized by the audience 
(Grice, 1989b [1969], p. 88). Hence, intention is crucial for 
shaping an utterance and for the recognition of this fact by 
the audience. So in Grice’s model, we have three elements: 
(i) an utterer who has an intention; (ii) an utterance (or ut-
tered message) with a meaning shaped by both the utterer’s 
intention and the recognition of that very intention by the 
audience; and (iii) the audience’s reaction in relation to the 
recognition of some intention – in principle, the real intention 
of the utterer.8 In the section “Utterances, uncertainty, and 
bullshit: Applying Grice’s model”, we shall appeal to these fea-
tures in our case study.
Grice proposes four kinds of uses of “meaning”: (1) the 
timeless meaning of x; (2) the applied timeless meaning of x; 
(3) the occasion-meaning of x; and (4) the occasional mean-
ing of the speaker.9 The first three kinds may be explained in 
terms of the fourth, and this last one can be articulated by 
means of the utterer’s intention (Grice, 1989b [1969], p. 88-
90). This allows us to reproduce the main aspects of Grice’s 
model – later we will apply these to the case study (see Grice, 
1969, p. 105, Outline of the meaning based on intention):
U utters x intending A:
(1) to produce r,
(2) to think U intends A to produce r,
(3) to think U intends the fulfillment of 
(1) to be based on the fulfillment of (2).
[U: utterer; A: audience; r: action; x: utterance]
Applying the outline to the case of the tobacco indus-
try, U symbolizes the industry and A the public – citizens, 
policy-makers, judges, consumers, and so on. If we point spe-
cifically to the role played by intention, we can say that the to-
bacco industry planned a discursive strategy of manipulation 
addressed to the audience of its messages.
Grice’s outline is supplemented with a Principle and four 
conversational maxims in order to detect the communicative 
and significant adequacy of discourse, basically the conversa-
tional efficacy. Because of this, we will be able to display the 
“fiddles” that appear in the communication between the to-
bacco industry and the public realm.10 According to Grice, 
“our talk exchanges do not normally consist of a succession of 
disconnected remarks, and would not be rational if they did. 
They are […] cooperative efforts; and each participant rec-
ognizes in them, to some extent, a common purpose” (Grice, 
1989c [1975], p. 26). In light of this, Grice establishes a “Co-
operative Principle”: “Make your conversational contribu-
tion such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the 
accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which 
you are engaged” (Grice, 1989c [1975], p. 26). This general 
principle is supplemented with four categories in which to 
place other maxims for communication and meaning: quan-
tity; quality; relation;11 and manner. According to the quan-
tity category, the utterer must provide as much information 
as she can, but no more than necessary. The quality category, 
in turn, dictates that the utterer must not say something she 
takes to be false or even claim something with insufficient 
evidence. The category of manner requests that the utterer 
not be unclear and ambiguous, but rather brief and orderly 
(Grice, 1989c [1975], p. 27-29). Here we shall appeal to the 
categories of quantity, quality, and manner. In addition, it is 
worth noting Grice’s caveat that in some cases maxims can 
be violated with no intention and that, in fact, in casual con-
versations, this is common. In any case, this is not the type of 
communicative exchange with which we are concerned here 
(see Simons, 2010). We have two key elements that support 
our argument: Grice’s model for meaning analysis, and the 
conversational maxims.
Uncertainty, sound science 
and junk science
The strategy of questioning the science by means of 
bullshitting in order to prevent regulation has been developed 
for decades by polluters and producers of hazardous prod-
ucts, and the practice is now so common that it is stranger for 
science to not be challenged by some company or other that 
faces regulation.
In the USA, the National Toxicology Program12 (NTP) 
of the Department of Health and Human Services publishes 
a list of substances that can cause cancer. Before a new sub-
stance is added to the list, a public procedure of independent 
scientific reviews is performed. Aiming at avoiding the tag “it 
causes cancer”, scientists hired by industry have come to op-
pose the description “it causes cancer” in the case of alcoholic 
beverages, beryllium, ethylene oxide, nickel compounds, and 
so on, thereby defying the empirical evidence that underlies 
the proposed designation (Gough, 2003, p. 10).
8 We emphasize the expression “in principle” because it is not always the real intention that is recognized, but another one. And as we 
shall see, to admit this is a basic point for our argument.
9 We are particularly focusing on the speaker’s occasion-meaning (Grice, 1989b [1969], p. 90-91).
10 We use “fiddle” and not “mistake” because Grice’s maxims refer to communicative mistakes, but here that is not the case, since some 
degree of intention is involved.
11 We put aside this category because Grice himself does not develop it in his relevant texts for our purposes. In any case, since relevance 
and appropriateness are under the same range as that of the maxim of relation, they are equally violated in the tobacco war queries.
12 “National Toxicology Program” (http://ntp.niehs.nih.gov/).
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When considering the option of new regulations, those 
who oppose them raise the issue of scientific uncertainty, dis-
missing the force or the conclusive nature of evidence. For 
instance, the scientific community has reached a consensus 
and agrees that the broad spectrum UV radiation from the 
sun and tanning bed lamps cause skin cancer. However, some 
associations – most notably the Indoor Tanning Association 
– have tried to detract from the NTP designation by ques-
tioning the scientific evidence on which UV radiation was 
deemed carcinogenic (Michaels and Monforton, 2005, p. 39).
From the perspective of the companies involved or of 
the so-called movement of the junk science (Huber, 1991), there 
is an attempt to influence public opinion through the devalu-
ation of the results of scientific research that might threaten 
their interests. They adduce that many scientific studies and 
methods used in the regulatory and legal scenarios are defec-
tive, inconsistent or incomplete, classifying them as errone-
ous and premature to form the basis for possible regulations. 
Thus, they use the concepts of certainty and uncertainty in a 
very skewed way.
Scientific uncertainty is inevitable in designing disease 
prevention programs. People cannot be fed with toxic chem-
icals, for example, in order to see what causes cancer; instead, 
the effects are studied in laboratory animals. Both epidemi-
ological and laboratory studies contain many uncertainties, 
and scientists must extrapolate from specific evidence of these 
studies in order to causally infer some results and recommend 
protective measures. Certainty or absolute certainty is rarely 
an option (see Blumberg et al., 2010, p. 481-484).
Now, the key mechanism to generating and manipulat-
ing uncertainty is precisely to overstate the importance of the 
latter. It has allowed the delay of many regulations and mea-
sures to protect the health and safety of individuals and com-
munities. It is a public relations strategy that now also applies 
to legal issues aimed at constraining the capacity of the judi-
cial and regulator systems to address issues of public health 
and compensation to victims.
A paradigmatic case: 
The tobacco industry
The tobacco industry is one of the most ardent promot-
ers of doubt and uncertainty about the scientific research that 
concerns it. Since the 1950s, scientists specifically recruited 
for this industry were basically dedicated to question the fol-
lowing beliefs:
(i) the risk of death from lung cancer is higher in smok-
ers than in nonsmokers,
(ii) the role that smoking plays in heart and lung disease 
is highly important, and
(iii) smoking in public places increases the risk of disease 
in passive smokers.
In each case, the scientific community has unanimously 
admitted that smoking causes these conditions. However, the 
industry has campaigned to delay regulation and compen-
sation for victims for decades. In the mid-1950s, its strategy 
was created by Hill & Knowlton (H&K), a firm specializing 
in public relations and related fields. With its help, the tobac-
co industry focused on two core aspects of the relationship 
between smoking and risk: (i) cause-effect relationships had 
not been established; and (ii) the statistics did not provide an 
answer. The goal of the industry was to promote a high level 
of scientific uncertainty, as H&K recognized in a memoran-
dum where it is said that after five and a half years of effort, 
“an awareness of doubt and uncertainty around criticisms of 
snuff” has been successfully created (Michaels and Monfor-
ton, 2005, p. 40). It aimed at forcing the public to recognize 
that the theory that smoking causes lung cancer was not sci-
entifically established.
The industry recognized the value in magnifying the 
debate on the cause-effect relationship in the case of smok-
ing and lung cancer. To this end, in 1960 it started its own 
strategy for fostering doubt: “Doubt is our product since it is 
the best way to compete with ‘facts’ that are on the minds of 
the general public. And it is also the means for establishing a 
controversy” (Michaels and Monforton, 2005, p. 40). How-
ever, the tobacco industry has not been the only one to bene-
fit from a strategy of this kind, since the generation of doubt 
about evidence, findings and methodologies is ubiquitous in 
some groups opposed to governmental attempts to regulate 
health hazards.
Managing uncertainty
There were two basic ways of artificially manipulating 
the uncertainty generated by an industry that potentially 
faces regulation, namely the denial of the obvious, and the 
denial of the existence of conclusive results. The first begins 
to take shape in the 1920s, when in the lead, asbestos, and 
chemical industries one can perceive a tendency to down-
play and even deny the validity of methods and scientific re-
sults. In the early 1950s, a well-publicized investigation into 
the US Congress stoked the public interest in carcinogens 
in food. For two years, the Delaney Committee investigat-
ed “the nature, extent and impact of the using of chemical 
substances” in food. The committee listened to testimonies 
on the presence of chemicals – carcinogenic to animals – in 
food for humans.13 The Manufacturing Chemists’ Associa-
tion (MCA) feared that, in order to allay public suspicions 
about additives and pesticides in food, the Congress forced 
the industry to test chemicals that were pollutants or, at 
least, ready to be added to foods. In response, in 1951 the 
MCA hired H&K, which designed a plan for responding to 
the Delaney Committee.
13 See the Committee on Scientific and Regulatory Issues Underlying Pesticide Use Patterns and Agricultural Innovation, National Re-
search Council (1987, p. 174-176).
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The efforts of the MCA were partly successful and Con-
gress did not accept legislation that would respond to the ex-
pected evidence; instead they accepted less strict legislation in 
demanding regulation of chemicals in food. It was 1958 when 
Delaney could forbid the inclusion of cancer causing chemicals 
in foods, although the “Delaney clause” did not prevent the 
inclusion of chemical substances in food. This actually was 
a sort of success for H&K, which went ahead and designed a 
campaign based on a similar strategy to convince the public 
that smoking was not dangerous.14
The second type of strategy has been more subtle and 
corrosive to regulations. Although it was tested in the asbestos 
case, in the 1970s it was designed with greater sophistication. 
We should not forget that the set of regulatory agencies (EPA, 
OSHA, MSHA, NHTSA)15 was created in the US precisely 
in that decade in order to protect the environment and public 
health. But the response was immediate and took the form of a 
direct attack on the critical flank of all decision-making, name-
ly the science underlying regulation (or decision-oriented science).
The industry facing OSHA’s regulation did not intend 
to recognize those reports of scientific results that did not 
document a high proportion of disease among its own em-
ployees exposed to a particular substance, and that hence 
were not a sound basis for regulating such a substance. In this 
way, the tobacco industry indiscriminately extended claims 
that were not based on any epidemiological research. Reports 
were written under the claims that the human data used were 
not representative, that data obtained in animal studies were 
not relevant to human health, and that exposure data were 
incomplete and unreliable.16
Junk science
Those who seek to discredit scientific results and meth-
ods that are not in the interests of the companies that have to 
conform to government regulations have coined a very effec-
tive derogatory nickname: “junk science”. In opposition to its 
antagonist, “sound science”, “junk science” is defined as “work 
presented as valid science that falls outside the rigors of the 
scientific method and the peer review process. It can take the 
form of presentation of selective results, politically motivated 
distortions of scientifically sound papers, or the publishing of 
quasi-scientific non-reviewed journals” (UCS, Union of Con-
cerned Scientists) (Herrick and Jamieson, 2001, p. 12).
By the term “junk science”, some private companies are 
particularly concerned with the science that underlies reports 
regulating hazardous substances for health and safety (Mi-
chaels and Monforton, 2005, p. 43).17 Their main argument 
stresses that regulatory scientific methods are flawed, con-
tradictory and incomplete, or they lack certainty in their re-
sults. Consequently, it is concluded that scientific reports are 
a hasty attempt to enforce new forms of regulation (Michaels 
and Monforton, 2005, p. 43). On the basis of that conclusion, 
they intend to create uncertainty by linking regulatory sci-
entific activity to five shortcomings typically associated with 
what apparently a scientific activity is, but that actually is not 
(Herrick and Jamieson, 2001, p. 12):18 lack of appropriate cre-
dentials (appropriate background or training); lack of peer 
review; lack of publication; weak bibliographic lineage; and 
outright fraud. Any of these could appear in the most com-
mon areas of regulatory disputes: the court and academia. 
In the latter, the problem provoked by the conceptualization 
of “junk science” is evident, given the need to establish a valid 
criterion to distinguish the sound science from the “junk” sci-
ence.19 Haack (2005) has shown the difficulties in trying to 
concisely define the expression “junk science” and the negative 
consequences of its biased use. In this context, generating un-
certainty extends the problem until it comes to affect the very 
choice of assessors of those reports denounced as “pseudosci-
ence” and, therefore, affects the putative definition in which 
a judge could base her verdict on whether or not a report is 
defective (Haack, 2005, p. 66-68).
The main problem with studies of hazardous substances 
is that they are statistical. It is known that in epidemiological 
studies some uncertainty always appears. For example, in the 
laboratory only animals20 can be used and in field studies it is 
not possible to isolate the subjects from chemicals that sup-
posedly cause disease (Haack, 2005, p. 60). As a result, cor-
14 As Miller (1999, p. 129-130) points out, H&K recommended that the industry set up a research program to at least “demonstrate that 
a controversy existed”.
15 Environmental Protection Agency, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Mine Safety and Health Administration, National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration.
16 The case of the dichloro-benzidine (DCB) is an illustrative instance of this.
17 Many exaggerated cases of claims – such as “global warming is non-existent” – can be found in “Junkscience.com” (http://junkscience.com) 
(see Milloy, 1996).
18 This reflects how “various movements, parties, and interest groups can bestow the plenary authority of science on their own private 
meanings. With a little creativity in the art of conjuring, any group can make its views seem scientific” (Toumey, 1996, p. 151).
19 Haack points out that some attempts have been made in order to both define what sound science is and distinguish it from junk sci-
ence. In addition, some methodological standards have been proposed to be met, the form of that kind of knowledge has been given, 
and eventually it has been brought to the court (Haack, 2005).
20 In order to develop a cancer in a human, a time span of at least thirty years is needed, and since most animals do not live long enough 
to develop a cancer, this is a serious problem for extrapolations from studies with animals. Alternatively, animals are subjected to higher 
exposures of the supposedly harmful element. Proponents of the substance in question argue that the level of exposure never occurs in 
the case of humans (Michaels, 2008, p. 67-68).
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porations argue that government regulations cannot substan-
tiate reports containing any doubt or uncertainty. Obviously, 
these are unreasonable demands of accuracy that no regula-
tion could meet, since no reports are produced under condi-
tions of absolute certainty (Mitchell, 2009, p. 86). If certainty 
were a prerequisite, the degree of probability of death among 
the population or of damage to the environment would in-
crease (Haack, 2008, p. 70-73).
If, for instance, we surveyed 100,000 smokers for thir-
ty years21 by exposing them to harmful products that are not 
cigarettes, the relationship between smoking and developing 
some heart (cardiovascular) disease would be “lawful” if 80% of 
the studied subjects would develop it. But let us design a study 
with a smaller sample and a time span of five years. It would 
be then very probable that subjects would not get cancer. The 
demand of certainty therefore is used with the aim of show-
ing that smoking is not harmful according to the available 
knowledge at that time and due to definitive results in a very 
brief period of time (Michaels, 2008, p. 62).
Similarly, it is worth noting that there are still several 
scientific and legal gaps where the tobacco industry could 
oppose the scientific methods underlying the regulatory pol-
icies of governmental administrations. Mistakes in exposures 
classifications, inaproppriate sample choices, lack of the nec-
essary time, defective re-analyses, and other factors that could 
bring about one and the same disease are illustrations of this.22 
Hence, from now on we shall attempt to show how the to-
bacco industry has tried to avoid the regulation of cigarette 
consumption by manipulating the recipients of its messages.
Utterances, uncertainty, and 
bullshit: Applying Grice’s model
We are going to use some particular cases in which the 
tobacco industry has responded to attempts by both govern-
mental Administrations in the US and several civil associa-
tions to support new forms of regulation (see Michaels and 
Monforton, 2005). Our application of Grice’s model will 
point precisely to these cases.
Once the scientific community had established the com-
mon view that linked smoking to certain diseases, the H&K 
firm began a media campaign in order to minimize the effect 
of the reports published by the American Cancer Society, 
which associated smoking with cancer. In 1954, the journal 
True, the Man’s Magazine published an article (“Smoke with-
out fear”) by Donald Cooley in collaboration with H&K, 
that allows us to establish our strategy of analysis. From a 
linguistic perspective, two statements or utterances are note-
worthy here: “if you are a man or a woman who smokes, take 
it easy and enjoy”, and “if you are a smoker, smoke without 
fear” (Cooley, 1954, p. 1-2). These statements point directly 
to a conclusion that Michaels and Monforton (2005, p. 40) 
confirm, namely that in a confidential memorandum consul-
tors of H&K said that in a year and a half they had to create 
enough uncertainty about the theory that related smoking to 
cancer by making the public believe that there was no sound 
scientifically established discourse against smoking. H&K ob-
tained what it wanted.
In 1960, H&K began publishing the journal Tobacco and 
Health Research with the main goal of generating doubts about 
the theory that linked smoking to some diseases (Haack, 2005, 
p. 40). In addition, its strategy explicitly included the manipu-
lation of language and hence the forming of beliefs to the point 
of claiming that “doubt is our product” (Michaels and Mon-
forton, 2005, p. 40). The key point of this last statement was 
to make the public think that there is no scientific consensus 
about the links between smoking and cancer. So, these exam-
ples are clear cases for our hypothesis to be implemented.
Let’s see first how the manipulation thesis can be illus-
trated by applying Grice’s model structure. We shall analyze 
two cases falling under the model of meaning linked to in-
tention, and before studying several instances in which the 
Cooperative Principle is not met. The first statement we ana-
lyze (e1) is one proferred by H&K in 1955 (Bates and Rowell, 
1998; Michaels and Monforton, 2005, p. 40):
[e1] The “cause-effect” relationship is not proved.
The statement points to the relationship between 
smoking and some disease, usually cancer or heart disease. 
There is a plain disjuncture between the utterer’s actual in-
tention and the intention that the audience recognizes on 
the utterer’s side. The utterer (tobacco industry) wants 
the audience not to perceive the existing scientific consen-
sus about the direct relation between smoking and the fact 
of suffering some disease. The utterer expects that the au-
dience receives a particular intention, namely that the ut-
terer is disinterested and impartial about the truth-value 
of reports published by the Administration. However, the 
utterer does not explicitly transmit their intention, since 
the scientific community had come to a consensus by that 
point (Michaels and Monforton, 2005, p. 40). The mes-
sage received by the audience carries the clear intention of 
21 Most reliable epidemiological studies last between 20 and 30 years because a cancer caused by chemicals takes a long time to appear. 
Some epidemiological studies lasting less than 20 years are suspected of seeking negative results in order to raise doubt (Michaels, 
2008, p. 65).
22 Often an unrepresentative sample of the actual population is chosen – e.g., workers at risk of accidents – so that the mortality statistics 
of the studied disease are less significant than expected. When we have two chemicals that cause cancer and the sample is exposed 
to both, the most commonly used trick is to divert attention. For instance, a cancer caused by asbestos is indistinguishable from one 
produced by the consumption of cigarettes, and the chosen sample cannot be sufficiently controlled in order to be isolated (Michaels, 
2008, p. 64).
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conveying impartial information about several reports. The 
problem, of course, is that this is not the utterer’s actual inten-
tion. The disconnection between the actual intention and the 
perceived one (not made explicit yet) is hence plain.
Intention plays a relevant role in each stage of commu-
nication, whether it is the utterer’s intention or that of the 
audience (Grice, 1989b [1969]). The Gricean analysis of the 
different unnatural meanings allows him to directly tie to-
gether the utterer’s occasion meaning and intention, as out-
lined below. If we apply Grice’s model, U utters x with the 
following intentions:23
(1) A to produce a particular response r: r consists in that A 
thinks there is not a consensus within the scientific community 
(Grice, 1989b [1969], p. 92). This intention is implicit in anoth-
er more general intention, namely that of disinterestedly inform-
ing, although the latter one is not made explicit to A. A believes 
that the tobacco industry intends to disinterestedly inform the 
public about the “truth” of some reports uttered by the Admin-
istration. With A’s belief at hand, a new belief rises as its effect, 
namely that there is no consensus but just some scientific con-
troversy about it. If U’s actual intention were explicit, A would 
distrust it, since interests at stake would become apparent.
To identify a concealment of the truth-value of a state-
ment in this procedure, we should make it explicit. In that case, 
because the utterer hides her actual intentions in order to satis-
fy them, we can see that the truth-value actually underlies U’s 
intention. If U would not hide the statement of both her actual 
intention and its truth-value, then it would be much more dif-
ficult to achieve her goal (i.e., to make A believe that there is no 
scientific consensus). Grice believes that meaning depends ulti-
mately on the intention (Grice, 1989b [1969]), but in that case 
the actual meaning of the tobacco industry’s utterance is one, 
but that received by A is a different one, since the real intention 
and the intention understood after the utterance are different.
(2) A to think (recognize) that U intends (1): U utters 
something intending that A recognizes U’s intention. When 
U utters x, she does not wish for A to behave as if it recog-
nizes U’s actual intention – i.e., that U continues to smoke 
without worrying about her health because she sees no con-
sensus. By uttering x, instead, U wants A to infer that there 
is no consensus. This conclusion must be the product of the 
explicit statement of an allegedly first intention: that of dis-
interestedly informing. However, this is misleading because 
U’s intention is that A does not recognize the former’s real 
intention. Hence, A does not act on the basis of recognizing 
U’s real intention. In uttering x in front of A, H&K presents 
itself as impartially critical toward other scientists’ judgment.
(3) A to fulfill (1) on the basis of her fulfillment of (2): ac-
cording to A, U’s intention is that of disinterestedly informing 
the audience about the issue, and accordingly A acts by rec-
ognizing that intention. But in fact U’s intention is different, 
although (1) is produced and U achieves her goal. A believes 
that there is no consensus and then implies that she must not 
worry about any disease; she reaches this conclusion when she 
believes that U’s intention is other than the real one. U wants 
this information “input”24 to be transparent and A believes 
that U is showing her intentions. A believes that U wants (1) 
to be fulfilled in terms of the fulfillment of (2). This is where 
the disregard for the truth-value takes place.
If we remake (3), this is what we may obtain: A thinks 
that U expects that A recognizes U’s real intention and A acts 
according to the recognition of that intention. The mismatch 
emerges from the fact that A does not recognize U’s real in-
tention, but rather that which U wants her to recognize – and 
it is not the real one. In this case, A allows U intending (1), (2) 
and (3), and that all these are fulfilled, although she believes 
that she recognizes the real intention and acts accordingly.25 
Otherwise, the deception would be explicit. So we see that U 
(the tobacco industry) intends for A (smokers) to think that 
U intends r (continue smoking), and that this is based on both 
the recognition of U’s real intention and A’s believing in it.
Let’s analyze the second statement:
[e2] Statistics do not prove the answers.
This statement points out that (statistical) reports do 
not ensure the cause-effect relationship; that is, they cannot 
provide evidence to fully support their thesis, so must com-
ply with the best available evidence at the time. Companies’ 
consultants actually rely on this lack of accuracy to defend 
their points, despite the fact that repealing the regulation 
could cause much damage to public health (Michaels, 2008, 
p. 60). The tobacco industry intends to let the public know 
that these reports are not absolute, but rather based on incon-
clusive evidence and as such remain insufficient to support 
a possible proposal for regulation.26 The public captures the 
intention of the industry as something right – as an attempt 
to scrutinize these reports, as if the Administration had a tacit 
intention that was not to preserve public health.27
23 U: utterer (tobacco industry), A: audience (the public), r: response by A, x: U’s utterance.
24 This input is intention that A recognizes in U’s uttering, since the latter aims to be recognized as sincere.
25 It cannot be said that A acts only because she thinks she recognizes U’s real intention; in fact, there are other contextual factors that 
drive A to produce r, although the recognition of intention is crucial in this task.
26 Companies claim that there is not sufficient evidence to support a regulation; that is, that evidence is too weak to support proposing 
any regulation on the basis of a process of induction from it. Obviously, it is more doubtful to claim the possibility of absolute certainty 
(Haack, 2005, p. 67).
27 The lack of information about the real working of science makes it impossible for the public to see that scientific results do not obtain 
by demanding absolute certainties, but rather by requesting a sufficient support for regulation. The scientific research underlying regu-
lation usually makes inferences from limited evidence (Cartwright and Hardie, 2012, p. 135-138; Michael, 2008, p. 60).
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The analysis of e2 is the following: U utters x with the 
following intentions:
(1) A to produce a particular response r: in uttering e2, 
U (the tobacco industry) intends for A to not believe the 
reports of the Administration and to continue smoking (r). 
As in e1, U may effectively achieve her aim if A produces r; 
that is, if A doubts, to some extent, the reports that support 
tobacco regulation.
(2) A to think (recognize) that U intends (1): U wants A 
to believe that U utters something intending for A to recog-
nize her first intention (to produce r). Whenever A actually 
believes it, U achieves her goal. But in that case, A is wrong. U 
aims for A to understand the information given by the state-
ment as a sample of the real character of the reports, since U 
presupposes that A does not know a lot about scientific-reg-
ulatory procedures. Thus, the process of generating confusion 
seems clear: U takes advantage of the belief (naive, unjusti-
fied) that certainty is necessary in order to support regulation.
(3) A to fulfill (1) on the basis of her fulfillment of (2): as 
in e1, A thinks that U assumes that A herself will act to the 
extent that U’s real intention is recognized. U produces r be-
cause she thinks that A recognizes U’s real intention. How-
ever, this is not necessary. Again, U’s intention is tacit and is 
camouflaged under a different intention, full of interest and 
in order to cast doubt on the reports of the Administration 
and to buy time to keep people smoking. The strategy is to ap-
peal to the so-called “sound science” in order to give authority 
to its procedures and conclusions by showing that the science 
achieved by industry’s “collaborators” (some scientists) is good 
enough to overcome the uncertainties that the “junk science” 
generates. In all cases, the findings favor – though indirectly – 
the message to continue smoking.
Where is the bullshit?
We have shown that the lack of honesty on the part of 
H&K leads the audience to believe that there is something 
like objective information about smoking. But it is not so. 
Rather, it happens that U manipulates A because, among 
other things, U manages much more information than A 
about what happens; i.e., U is in a dominant position. On the 
one hand, U is able to afford scientific consensus but, on the 
other, U tries to show that such a consensus does not actual-
ly exist. The public, however, is involved in a clash between 
the industry and the Administration, and has no clear idea of 
who is telling the truth. Michaels and Monforton (2005) give 
an example in reference to the dispute between the scientific 
community and the industry around regulations of emissions 
by quoting Frank Luntz:28 “you need to continue to make the 
lack of scientific certainty a primary issue in the debate […] 
The scientific debate is closing [againts us] but not yet closed; 
there is still a window of opportunity to challenge the science” 
(Michaels and Monforton, 2005, p. 43). In 2003, the doubts 
generated by this debate allowed companies to stall regulato-
ry procedures and continue selling their products.
We have seen how the industry’s critical strategy against 
the Administration’s reports is developed. If the audience read 
the reports and capture the writer’s intention, there would be 
no dispute, but Grice’s model allows us to observe that it is 
not necessary for the industry to publish new reports. In fact, 
the article “Smoke without fear” is not a report, but merely 
an attack on the Administration’s reports. This permits us 
to ask the following question: just using a single report with 
its meaning, “how can a party attempt to defend a viewpoint 
while another party supports the opposite view?”. The answer 
can be found in Grice’s analysis of meaning. As we identified 
the difference in the utterer’s meaning of an utterance and 
the audience’s one, we can now see the difference in meaning 
between an utterer (the Administration) and a possible audi-
ence, which alters what the public receives.
If an Administration publishes a serious report, under-
taken with reliable methods, and being sufficiently clear that 
the scientific community agrees to propose regulations on to-
bacco and smoking for the whole country (USA), we would 
say that this is its intention. But tobacco companies then read 
the report, which is statistical, and without making any count-
er-report – or re-analyzing it, but without making any changes 
to its content –  they propose the opposite: i.e., no regulation 
is necessary. Well, this example fits perfectly with Grice’s idea 
that the natural meaning of an utterance may be understood 
in terms of the utterer’s occasion-meaning, and this one may 
be construed in terms of the utterer’s intention (Grice, 1989b 
[1969], p. 484). As has been shown, utterers say more (or oth-
erwise) than what their utterances literally mean. Therefore, 
we have a single report, but different meanings, since intention 
changes depending on where the report is processed. For the 
Administration, the report is used for regulation; in the case of 
the industry, it is used against regulation because of supposed 
flaws, insufficient evidence, and other shortcomings.
We have shown that the tobacco industry has tried 
(probably successfully) to save time at the expense of the use 
of language in its favor, with statements that make explicit its 
intention to create doubts (“you need to continue to make 
the lack of scientific certainty a primary issue in the debate”), 
or to hide its intentions from the public (“the evidence is in-
conclusive”). In the case of public sphere, it is crucial to ana-
lyze the tobacco industry consultants’ use of language. Here 
we have applied Grice’s model, analysis and categories, since 
they are effective tools for understanding the kind of bullshit 
that is extending both to the regulation discourse in the USA 
and to the image and projection of science as knowledge and 
supplier of evidences.29 In the public sphere (not academic or 
28 Luntz is a political consultant to the Republican Party in the USA.
29 For the British case, and from a different perspective, see for instance Belfiore (2009).
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judicial), articles published in several journals helped to spread 
the idea that smoking is not harmful by means of good adver-
tising policy, some fallacies, and appealing to the audience’s 
emotions. Truth-value never interested so much as outright 
lie. Bullshit was the main strategy with which, as we have seen 
by Grice’s model, one can create opacity around the utterer’s 
intention in order to make the audience trust the offered infor-
mation, since this is provided in terms of disinterested informa-
tion, though never lying for it. Furthermore, it is a strategy that 
violates some of Grice’s maxims for the Cooperation Principle: 
firstly, the tobacco industry does not provide as much informa-
tion as it can (bullshit versus the quantity category); secondly, 
the utterer does not say anything that it thinks to be false, but 
simply tries to claim that evidences are never sufficient (bull-
shit versus the quality category, in Frankfurt’s sense); and finally, 
the utterer is being unclear and ambiguous (bullshit versus the 
manner category, in Cohen’s sense) (see Law, 2011, Chapter 6).
Fighting against bullshit is a difficult task in cases like the 
one shown here. The inclusion of the concept of junk science in 
the debate has played a significant role in discrediting real sci-
entific reports and has become a significant part of everyday 
language. It is difficult to counteract the effects of big business 
campaigns, but efforts to avoid the corruption of the concept 
of science should be made in order to prevent corporations 
from misusing language so as to delay regulations at the cost 
of endangering public health and the environment.
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